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Abstract
This paper develops and estimates a macro-ﬁnance model that combines a canon-
ical aﬃne no-arbitrage ﬁnance speciﬁcation of the term structure with standard
macroeconomic aggregate relationships for output and inﬂation. From this new em-
pirical formulation, we obtain several interesting results: (1) the latent term structure
factors from ﬁnance no-arbitrage models appear to have important macroeconomic
and monetary policy underpinnings, (2) there is no evidence of monetary policy in-
ertia or a slow partial adjustment of the policy interest rate by the Federal Reserve,
and (3) both forward-looking and backward-looking elements play important roles
in macroeconomic dynamics.
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Bonds of various maturities all trade simultaneously in a well-organized market that appears
to preclude opportunities for ﬁnancial arbitrage. Indeed, the assumption of no arbitrage is
central to an enormous literature that is devoted to the empirical analysis of bond pricing and
the yield curve. This research has found that almost all movements in the yield curve can be
captured in a no-arbitrage framework in which yields are linear functions of a few unobservable
or latent factors (e.g., Duﬃe and Kan 1996, Litterman and Scheinkman 1991, and Dai and
Singleton 2000). However, while these popular aﬃne no-arbitrage models do provide useful
statistical descriptions of the term structure, they oﬀer little insight into the economic nature of
the underlying latent factors or forces that drive movements in interest rates. To provide such
insight, this paper combines a canonical aﬃne no-arbitrage model of the term structure with a
standard macroeconomic model.
The short-term interest rate is a critical point of intersection between the ﬁnance and macro-
economic perspectives. From a ﬁnance perspective, the short rate is a fundamental building block
for rates of other maturities because long yields are risk-adjusted averages of expected future
short rates. From a macro perspective, the short rate is a key policy instrument under the direct
control of the central bank, which adjusts the rate in order to achieve the economic stabilization
goals of monetary policy. Together, the two perspectives suggest that understanding the manner
in which central banks move the short rate in response to fundamental macroeconomic shocks
should explain movements in the short end of the yield curve; furthermore, with the consis-
tency between long and short rates enforced by the no-arbitrage assumption, expected future
macroeconomic variation should account for movements farther out on the yield curve as well.
In our combined macro-ﬁnance analysis, we ﬁnd that the standard no-arbitrage term struc-
ture factors do have clear macroeconomic underpinnings, which provide insight into the behav-
ior of the yield curve. Conversely, a joint macro-ﬁnance perspective can also illuminate various
macroeconomic issues, since the addition of term structure information to a macroeconomic
model can help sharpen inference. For example, in a macro-ﬁnance model, the term structure
factors, which summarize expectations about future interest rates, in turn reﬂect expectations
about the future dynamics of the economy. With forward-looking economic agents, these expec-
tations should be important determinants of current and future macroeconomic variables. The
relative importance of forward- versus backward-looking elements in the dynamics of the econ-
1omy is an important unresolved issue in macroeconomics that the incorporation of term structure
information may help resolve. Indeed, in our joint macro-ﬁnance estimates, the forward-looking
elements play an important role in macroeconomic dynamics. Another hotly debated macro
issue is whether central banks engage in interest rate smoothing or gradual partial adjustment
in setting monetary policy (e.g., Rudebusch 2002b). With the inclusion of information from the
term structure, we show that, contrary to much speculation in the literature, central banks do
not conduct such inertial policy actions.
We begin our analysis in the next section by estimating an oﬀ-the-shelf aﬃne no-arbitrage
model of the term structure. As usual, this model is estimated using data on yields but not
macroeconomic variables. We label this standard model the “yields-only” model to distinguish it
from our subsequent “macro-ﬁnance” model that adds macroeconomic content. Our yields-only
model introduces the aﬃne, no-arbitrage term structure representation and provides a useful
benchmark to evaluate the combined macro-ﬁnance model. One distinctive feature of our yields-
only model is that it has only two latent factors instead of the three factors that are more
commonly–though by no means exclusively–used. Our choice of just two factors reﬂects the
fact that they appear suﬃcient to account for variation in the yield curve during our fairly short
sample, which runs from 1988 to 2000. Our use of a short sample is motivated by our interest
in relating the term structure factors to macroeconomic fundamentals. Although relationships
among yields may have remained stable for much of the postwar period, as implicitly assumed
by most term structure analyses, the preponderance of empirical evidence suggests that the rela-
tionships between interest rates and macroeconomic variables changed during the past 40 years,
as the reaction function setting monetary policy has changed (e.g., Fuhrer 1996). Therefore, a
macro-ﬁnance model likely will not be stable over the entire postwar period, so we limit our
sample to a recent short interval of plausible stability in the monetary policy regime.
In Section 3, we provide some initial evidence on the relationship between the term structure
factors and macroeconomic variables. Speciﬁcally, we are interested in reconciling the yields-only
latent factor ﬁnance representation of the short rate with the usual monetary policy reaction
function in macroeconomics. The former expresses the short rate as the sum of various latent
factors, while the latter relates the short rate to macroeconomic fundamentals–for example,
in the Taylor rule (Taylor 1993), the short rate depends on inﬂation and output. Section 3
reconciles the ﬁnance and macro representations by suggesting an interpretation of one of the
2latent factors as a perceived inﬂation target and the other as a cyclical monetary policy response
to the economy.
Section 4 builds on this interpretation and constructs a complete model that combines an
aﬃne no-arbitrage term structure with a small macroeconomic model that has rational expecta-
tions as well as inertial elements. The combined macro-ﬁnance model is estimated from the data
by maximum likelihood methods and demonstrates a ﬁt and dynamics comparable to the sepa-
rate yields-only model and a stand-alone macroeconomic model. The contribution of Section 4
is to provide a uniﬁed framework containing both models that is estimated from the data. This
new framework is able to interpret the latent factors of the yield curve in terms of macroeco-
nomic variables. It also sheds light on the importance of inﬂation and output expectations in the
economy and the extent of monetary policy inertia or partial adjustment. Section 5 concludes
with suggestions for future applications of this model.
Several other recent papers also have explored macroeconomic inﬂuences on the yield curve,
and it is perhaps useful to provide a brief comparison of our analysis to this research. Overall, the
broad contour of our results is quite consistent with much of this recent research, which relates
the general level of interest rates to an expected underlying inﬂation component and the slope or
tilt of the yield curve to monetary policy actions. However, there are three distinctive features of
our work. First, we use a structural macroeconomic speciﬁcation of the kind that has been quite
popular in recent macro research. A similar model–which is essentially a monthly version of the
formulation in Rudebusch (2002a)–was employed in an interesting analysis of German data by
Hördahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2002). As a useful alternative formulation, many other papers have
related macro variables to the yield curve using little or no macroeconomic structure, including,
for example, Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2003), Wu (2001), Dewachter
and Lyrio (2002), Kozicki and Tinsley (2001), Piazzesi (2003), Diebold, Rudebusch, and Aruoba
(2003), and Evans and Marshall (2001). Second, in conformity with the vast ﬁnance literature,
we use an aﬃne no-arbitrage structure in which the yield curve (and the price of risk) depends on
a few latent factors. This arrangement allows a clear comparison of the term structure elements
in our model to the parallel existing ﬁnance literature. In contrast, some recent research, such
as Evans and Marshall (2001), does not impose the no-arbitrage ﬁnance restrictions, while other
research, such as Ang and Piazzesi (2003) and Hördahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2002), impose
the restrictions but model the term structure in terms of both observable macro factors and
3residual unobserved factors, which are not necessarily comparable to the unobserved factors in
traditional ﬁnance models. Finally, as in Diebold, Rudebusch, and Aruoba (2003), our model
also allows for a bi-directional feedback between the term structure factors and macro variables.
In contrast, as in Ang and Piazzesi (2003), the macro sector is often modeled as completely
exogenous to the yield curve.
2. A No-Arbitrage Yields-Only Model
We begin by estimating a standard ﬁnance model of the term structure, which is based on the
assumption that there are no riskless arbitrage opportunities among bonds of various maturities.
This model has no explicit macroeconomic content; however, it introduces the aﬃne, no-arbitrage
bond pricing speciﬁcation and provides a yields-only baseline for comparison with the combined
macro-ﬁnance model below.
The canonical ﬁnance term structure model contains three basic equations. The ﬁrst is the
transition equation for the state vector relevant for pricing bonds. We assume there are two
latent factors Lt and St a n dt h a tt h es t a t ev e c t o r ,Ft =( Lt,S t) , is a Gaussian VAR(1) process:
Ft = ρFt−1 +Σ εt, (2.1)
where εt is i.i.d. N(0,I 2), Σ is diagonal, and ρ is a 2 × 2 lower triangular matrix. The second
equation deﬁnes the one-period short rate it to be a linear function of the latent variables with
a constant δ0:
it = δ0 + Lt + St = δ0 + δ 
1Ft. (2.2)
Without loss of generality, equation (2.2) implies unitary loadings of the two factors on the short
rate because of the normalization of these unobservable factors. Finally, following Constantinides
(1992), Dai and Singleton (2000, 2002), Duﬀee (2002), and others, the price of risk associated







= λ0 + λ1Ft. (2.3)
The state transition equation (2.1), the short rate equation (2.2), and the price of risk
(2.3) form a discrete-time Gaussian two-factor term structure model. In such a structure, the
1 As Duﬀee (2002) argues, compared to the speciﬁcation in which the risk price is a multiple of the volatility
of the underlying shocks, this alternative speciﬁcation allows the compensation for interest rate risk to vary
independently of such volatility. As shown by Dai and Singleton (2002), such ﬂexibility proves to be very useful
in matching empirical properties of the term structure. For an intuitive discussion of the price of risk, see Fisher
(2001).




where, as shown in the appendix, the coeﬃcients Aj and Bj are recursively deﬁned by
A1 = −δ0; B1 = −δ1 (2.5)







jΣΣ Bj + A1 (2.6)
Bj+1 = B
 
j(ρ −Σλ1)+B1; j =1 ,2,...,J. (2.7)
Given this bond pricing, the continuously compounded yield to maturity ij,t of a j-period nominal
zero-coupon bond is given by the linear function
ij,t = −ln(bj,t)/j = Aj + B 
jFt, (2.8)
where Aj = −Aj/j and Bj = −Bj/j.
For a given set of observed yields, the likelihood function of this model can be calculated in
closed form and the model can be estimated by maximum likelihood. We estimate this model
using end-of-month data from January 1988 to December 2000 on ﬁve U.S. Treasury zero-coupon
yields that have maturities of 1, 3, 12, 36, and 60 months. (The yields are unsmoothed Fama-
Bliss data expressed at an annual rate in percent.) Since there are two underlying latent factors
but ﬁve observable yields, we follow the usual strategy and assume that the 3-, 12-, and 36-
month yields are measured with i.i.d. error, as in Ang and Piazzesi (2003). The estimated size
of such measurement error is one common metric to assess model ﬁt.
We limit the estimation sample in order to increase the chance that it is drawn from a single
stable period of monetary policy behavior. Over the entire postwar sample, the reaction of the
Federal Reserve in adjusting the short rate in response to macroeconomic shocks appears to have
changed.2 In particular, the Fed’s short rate response to changes in inﬂation during the 1970s
has been found to be less vigorous than in the 1990s. In addition, Rudebusch and Wu (2004)
ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of a change in the pricing of risk since the mid 1980s. Such changes
alter the relationship between the term structure and macroeconomic variables. To avoid such
instability, our fairly short sample period falls completely within Alan Greenspan’s tenure as
Fed Chairman, which is often treated as a consistent monetary policy regime.
2 For example, see Fuhrer (1996), Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000), and Rude-
busch (2003).
5For our sample, just two factors appear suﬃcient to capture movements in the yield curve.
This perhaps reﬂects the exclusion from our sample of the period of heightened interest rate
volatility during the late 1970s and early 1980s. One indication of the superﬂuous nature of a
third factor is provided by a principal component analysis. In our sample, the ﬁrst principal
component captures 93.1 percent of the variation in the ﬁve yields, and the ﬁrst and second prin-
cipal components together capture 99.3 percent of the variation. That is, just two components
can account for essentially all of the movements in the yield curve.3
The parameter estimates of the yields-only model are reported in Table 1.4 As is typically
found in empirical estimates of such a term structure model, the latent factors diﬀer somewhat
in their time-series properties as shown by the estimated ρ. The factor Lt is very persistent,
while St is less so. There is also a small but signiﬁcant cross-correlation between these factors.
The parameters in λ1, which determine the time variation in the price of risk, appear signiﬁcant
as well. Finally, the model ﬁts the 3-, 12-, and 36-month rates with measurement error standard
deviations of 20, 35, and 16 basis points, respectively.
The factor loadings of the yields-only model are displayed in Figure 1. These loadings show
the initial response of yields of various maturities to a one percentage point increase in each
factor. A positive shock to Lt raises the yields of all maturities by almost an identical amount.
This eﬀect induces an essentially parallel shift in the term structure that boosts the level of the
whole yield curve, so the Lt factor is often called a “level” factor, which is a term we will adopt.
Likewise, a positive shock to St increases short-term yields by much more than the long-term
yields, so the yield curve tilts and becomes less steeply upward sloped (or more steeply downward
sloped); thus, this factor is termed the “slope” factor.
Table 2 reports the variance decomposition for 1-month, 12-month, and 5-year yields at
diﬀerent forecast horizons. The level factor Lt accounts for a substantial part of the variance at
the long end of the yield curve at all horizons and at the short and middle ranges of the yield
curve at medium to long horizons. At shorter horizons, the slope factor St accounts for much
of the variance of the short and middle ranges of the yield curve.
3 Bomﬁm (2003) also ﬁnds that a two-factor model ﬁts a 1989-2001 term structure sample very well.
4 Note that in the pricing formula (2.6), the constant λ0 only enters the deﬁnition of Aj, so changes in λ0 aﬀect
the steady-state shape of the yield curve and not its variation over time. To reduce the number of parameters
to be estimated, we impose the restriction that λ0 =0 . Accordingly, we de-mean the bond yields and focus on
the variations of yields from sample averages in the model estimation. This procedure may slightly alter the
parameter estimates since the eﬀects of Bj and Σ on Aj through a Jensen’s inequality term will be ignored.
However, in practice, the amount of information contained in this term is trivial, especially in the present model
estimation where the longest maturity is 5 years.
6Overall, the results in Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 1 reveal an empirical no-arbitrage model–
even over our short sample–that is quite consistent with existing estimated models in the
empirical ﬁnance literature on bond pricing.
3. Term Structure Factors and Monetary Policy
This section compares the ﬁnance and macro views of the short-term interest rate. It tries
to reconcile these two views by relating the yields-only term structure factors obtained above
to macroeconomic variables and monetary policy, in order to provide some motivation for the
combined macroeconomic and term structure model that is rigorously estimated in Section 4.
As noted above, the model of choice in ﬁnance decomposes the short-term interest rate into
the sum of unobserved factors:
it = δ0 +Lt + St. (3.1)
These factors are then modeled as autoregressive time series that appear unrelated to macro-
economic variation.
In contrast, from a macro perspective, the short rate is determined by a monetary policy
reaction function:
it = G(Xt)+ut, (3.2)
where Xt is a vector of observable macroeconomic variables and ut is an unobserved shock (as
in, for example, Rudebusch and Svensson 1999 and Taylor 1999). As an empirical matter, many
diﬀerent formulations of the reaction function G(Xt) have been estimated by various researchers.
In large part, this diversity reﬂects the complexity of the implementation of monetary policy.
Central banks typically react with some ﬂexibility to real-time data on a large set of informational
indicators and variables. This reaction is diﬃcult to model comprehensively with a simple linear
regression using ﬁnal revised data. (See, for example, discussion and references in Rudebusch
1998, 2002b.)
Still, a large number of recent empirical studies of central bank behavior have employed
some variant of the Taylor (1993) rule to estimate a useful approximation to the monetary
policy reaction function.5 One version of the Taylor rule can be written as
it = r∗ + π∗
t + gπ(πt − π∗
t)+gyyt + ut, (3.3)
5 In the U.S., these include Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000), Kozicki (1999), Judd and Rudebusch (1998),
and Rudebusch (2002b).
7where r∗ is the equilibrium real rate, π∗
t is the central bank’s inﬂation target, πt is the annual
inﬂation rate, and yt is a measure of the output gap or capacity utilization. In this Taylor
rule, the short-term interest rate is set equal to its long-run level (r∗ + π∗
t) plus two cyclical
adjustments to respond to deviations from the macroeconomic policy goals, speciﬁcally, the
distance of inﬂation from an inﬂation target, πt − π∗
t, and the distance of real output from its
long-run potential, yt.
Although the ﬁnance and macro representations of the short rate (3.1) and (3.3) appear
dissimilar and are obtained in very diﬀerent settings, we would argue that there is in fact a
close connection between them.6 A key element in making this connection is the identiﬁcation
of Lt, which captures movements in the general level of nominal interest rates, with the neutral
level of the short rate; that is, we consider movements in Lt to be a close approximation to
movements in r∗ +π∗
t. To support this assumption, Figure 2 provides some suggestive evidence
about the relationship between the yields-only level factor and inﬂation. Figure 2 displays
the factor Lt (which has zero mean), annual inﬂation (πt, which is the de-meaned 12-month
percent change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures), the one-year-ahead
expectation of annual inﬂation (which is the de-meaned expectation from the Michigan survey
of households–as in Rudebusch 2002a), and a measure of long-run inﬂation compensation or
inﬂation expectations. The last of these, which is measured as the spread between 10-year
nominal and indexed Treasury debt, is only available starting in 1997 with the ﬁrst issuance of
U.S. indexed debt.7 In Figure 2, the estimated yields-only Lt appears to be closely linked to
actual and expected inﬂation at both high and low frequencies. Over the entire sample, actual
and expected inﬂation and the level factor all have slowly trended down about 2 percentage
points. This decline is consistent with the view that over this period the Federal Reserve
conducted an opportunistic disinﬂation, with a gradual ratcheting down of inﬂation and the
inﬂation target over time (Bomﬁm and Rudebusch 2000). Alternatively, our analysis considers
only private sector perceptions, and there may be diﬀerences between the true and perceived
monetary policy inﬂation targets. Indeed, as shown in Orphanides and Williams (2003), when
private agents have to learn about the monetary policy regime, long-run inﬂation expectations
may drift quite far from even a constant true central bank inﬂation target.
The general identiﬁcation of the overall level of interest rates with the perceived inﬂation
6 Ang and Piazzesi (2003) and Dewachter and Lyrio (2002) note a similar connection.
7 This yield spread is a good but not perfect measure of inﬂation expectations because of premia for inﬂation
risk and liquidity (e.g., Shen and Corning 2002).
8goal of the central bank is a common theme in the recent macro-ﬁnance literature (notably,
Kozicki and Tinsley 2001, Dewachter and Lyrio 2002, and Hördahl, Tristani, and Vestin 2002).
Variation in r∗ also could account for some of the variation in Lt; however, we assume that
month-to-month variation in π∗
t dominates the Lt ﬂuctuations during our 1988 to 2000 sample.
This is quite plausible given the evidence from the market for indexed debt shown in Figure
2, in which movements in the two solid lines track each other very closely (after adjusting for
the mean). Based on such evidence for the U.K., Barr and Campbell (1997) conclude that
“almost 80 percent of the movement in long-term nominal rates appears to be due to changes
in expected long-term inﬂation.” In the U.S., Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003) also argue
that movements in long rates reﬂect ﬂuctuations in inﬂation perceptions and not real rates.
Similarly, a constant r∗ is commonly assumed in the literature on Taylor rules.8
As a ﬁrst approximation then, we identify movements in Lt with movements in the perceived
inﬂation target of the central bank, π∗
t. However, ﬁnding a stable systematic link between an
estimated level factor Lt and a small set of observables is diﬃcult. In practice, as the perceived
anchor for inﬂation, Lt is likely to be a complicated function of past inﬂation, expected future
inﬂation, general macroeconomic conditions, and even Federal Reserve statements and other
actions regarding policy goals. For tractability, we consider only a very simple ﬁltering scheme
where Lt is a weighted average of current inﬂation and the lagged level factor:
Lt = ρlLt−1 +( 1−ρl)πt + εL,t. (3.4)
We will embed this type of linear updating rule in our complete macro-ﬁnance model estimated
in the next section. However, even in a simple single-equation OLS regression using our very
short sample of data, this formulation has some support using the yields-only level factor:
Lt =0 .96Lt−1 +0 .04πt + εL,t (3.5)
(0.03) (0.03)
¯ R2 = .91, σεL = .27.
Still, we view the speciﬁcation (3.4) as only a useful but imperfect approximation.9
8 Exceptions include Rudebusch (2001), Laubach and Williams (2003), and Trehan and Wu (2003); however,
even in these exceptions, r
∗ varies slowly over time.
9 Kozicki and Tinsley (2001) also support such an “adaptive learning” speciﬁcation, while Hördahl, Tristani,
and Vestin (2002) use an even simpler (near-) random walk process for underlying inﬂation. In our level regression,
we cannot reject the restriction that the coeﬃcients sum to one at the 10 percent level, and as will be clear below,
this restriction provides nominal interest rates and inﬂation with dynamic homogeneity.
9Given the identiﬁcation of Lt with the inﬂation target, the remaining slope factor should
capture the cyclical response of the central bank; that is, St = gπ(πt − Lt)+gyyt.A g a i n ,
in Section 4, we will rigorously estimate this relationship in a complete macro-ﬁnance model.
However, the simple OLS regression of the yields-only slope factor on inﬂation and output gives
remarkably promising results:
St =1 .28(πt − Lt)+0 .46yt + uS,t (3.6)
(0.15) (0.06)
¯ R2 = .52, σuS = .87,
where yt is de-meaned industrial capacity utilization, which we will typically refer to as output,
although it is, strictly speaking, a measure of the output gap.10 In this regression, the coeﬃcients
represent estimates of the perceived policy response of the Fed. Speciﬁcally, the estimate of
gπ =1 .28 reﬂects the inﬂation response: If inﬂation moves one percentage point above its target
(Lt), the Fed raises St (or, roughly, the short rate relative to the long rate) by 128 basis points.11
In this regard, it is important to note that the restriction that the coeﬃcients on πt and Lt are
equal with opposite sign cannot be rejected at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level. For output, the
estimated response coeﬃcient gy = .46 implies that if real utilization rises one percentage point,
the Fed raises St by 46 basis points. These estimated policy responses are very close to the
values originally proposed by Taylor (1993) and to the Taylor rule estimates obtained in various
empirical studies (for example, Kozicki 1999, Judd and Rudebusch 1998, and Rudebusch 2001).
(Capacity utilization is about 1.4 times more cyclically variable than the output gap, so the
equivalent gy estimate in output gap terms is about .65.) For our purposes, however, what is
most important about the Taylor rule regression (3.6) is that the associated ﬁtted slope factor,
ˆ St tracks the actual yields-only slope factor St quite well ( ¯ R2 = .52). This correspondence is
shown in Figure 3, which displays the yields-only slope factor St as a solid line and the ﬁtted
Taylor rule values ˆ St as a dashed line. The close connection between St and ˆ St suggests that the
Taylor rule, which partitions the short rate into a neutral rate and a cyclical component, can be
appropriately identiﬁed with the usual ﬁnance partition of the short rate into level and slope.
10 Given serial correlation in the regression errors, which is discussed below, robust standard errors for the coef-
ﬁcients are reported in parentheses. While Taylor rule estimates are typically obtained using quarterly deviations
of GDP from potential, for our monthly analysis, capacity utilization provides an anlogous measure of the output
gap for the industrial sector.
11 As typical for Taylor rule estimates in this sample, the inﬂation response coeﬃcient is greater than one,
so the Fed acts to damp increases in inﬂation by raising nominal and real interest rates–the so-called Taylor
principle for economic stabilization.
10However, in the next section, we will provide a structural macro-ﬁnance system estimation of
this relationship that is much more rigorous and compelling.
Despite a fairly remarkable ﬁt in Figure 3, some large persistent diﬀerences between St and
ˆ St do remain, and these diﬀerences have been at the center of an important debate in macro-
economics. These serially correlated deviations–denoted uS,t–have been given two diﬀerent
interpretations in the literature. The ﬁrst of these is that the deviations reﬂect a slow partial
adjustment by the Fed of the actual short-term interest rate to its desired value as given by the
policy rule. Such behavior is often called monetary policy inertia or interest rate smoothing,
and it suggests a partial adjustment dynamic speciﬁcation for the slope factor such as
St =( 1− ρS)(gπ(πt − Lt)+gyyt)+ρSSt−1 + εS,t. (3.7)
This speciﬁcation and its structural partial adjustment interpretation have been used by Wood-
ford (1999), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000), and many others.
In contrast, a second interpretation of the deviations between St and ˆ St is that they rep-
resent inadequacies in the Taylor rule in modeling all of the various inﬂuences on monetary
policy. Under this view, the uS,t are the eﬀect of policy responses to special circumstances and
information that were not captured by the simple Taylor rule speciﬁcation but were important
to policymakers (as described in Rudebusch 2002b). Indeed, the persistent deviations between
the actual and ﬁtted slope factors in Figure 3 appear to correspond to several special episodes in
which policy reacted to more determinants than just current readings on inﬂation and output.
Most notably, the deviation in 1992 and 1993, when the actual slope factor (and associated short
rates) was pushed much lower than the ﬁtted slope based on inﬂation and output readings, is
typically interpreted as a Federal Reserve response to a persistent “credit crunch” shock or dis-
ruption in the ﬂow of credit.12 This interpretation of the dynamics of the Taylor rule suggests
a speciﬁcation such as
St = gπ(πt − Lt)+gyyt + uS,t ; uS,t = ρuuS,t−1 + εS,t. (3.8)
In this speciﬁcation, the AR(1) serially correlated shocks represent the Fed’s reaction to
12 As Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan testiﬁed to Congress on June 22, 1994: “Households and businesses
became much more reluctant to borrow and spend and lenders to extend credit–a phenomenon often referred to
as the ‘credit crunch.’ In an endeavor to defuse these ﬁnancial strains, we moved short-term rates lower in a long
series of steps that ended in the late summer of 1992, and we held them at unusually low levels through the end
of 1993–both absolutely and, importantly, relative to inﬂation.”
11persistent inﬂuences–beyond current inﬂation and output.13
Choosing between the partial adjustment and serially correlated shocks speciﬁcations de-
pends crucially on separating the inﬂuences of contemporaneous and lagged regressors, which
are typically diﬃcult to untangle in a single equation context (e.g., Blinder 1986). As Rudebusch
2002b stresses, this problem is particularly acute for estimated monetary policy rules, because
uncertainty in modeling the desired policy rate (given the endogeneity of regressors, the real-
time nature of the information set, and the small samples available) makes the single-equation
evidence on the rule’s dynamic speciﬁcation suspect.14 Thus, a policy rule with slow partial
adjustment and no serial correlation in the errors will be diﬃcult to distinguish empirically
from a policy rule that has immediate policy adjustment but highly serially correlated shocks.
However, information contained in the term structure can help distinguish between these two
interpretations. In particular, Rudebusch (2002b) demonstrates that a slow partial adjustment
of the short rate to new information by the Fed should imply the existence of predictable future
variation in the short rate that is not present with serially correlated shocks. In fact, the general
lack of predictive information in the yield curve about changes in the short rate suggests the
absence of policy inertia. In the next section, for the ﬁrst time, it will be possible to rigorously
analyze this issue in a combined model that includes the macro variables as well as a no-arbitrage
term structure. Our general model will allow for both types of policy rule dynamics–that is,
partial adjustment and persistent shocks–and let the data judge between these interpretations.
4. A Complete Macro-Finance Model
Inspired by the above yields-only factor regression results, this section presents a combined
macro-ﬁnance model in which the term structure factors are jointly estimated with macroeco-
nomic relationships. These results provide a rigorous system estimation of the relationships
described in Section 3. We ﬁrst describe the equations of the model and then provide maximum
likelihood estimates and analysis.
13 These rule deviations are not exogenous monetary policy shocks that represent actions independent of the
economy; instead, they are endogenous responses to a variety of inﬂuences that cannot be captured by some easily
observable variable such as output or inﬂation. For example, persistent deviations between the true and perceived
inﬂation goals could show up as serially correlated residuals.
14 Also, see English, Nelson, and Sack (2003) and Söderlind, Söderström, and Vredin (2003).
124.1. Model Structure
In the macro-ﬁnance model, the one-month short rate is deﬁned to be the sum of two latent
term structure factors
it = δ0 + Lm
t +Sm
t , (4.1)
as in a typical aﬃne no-arbitrage term structure representation, where Lm
t and Sm
t denote
unobserved macro-ﬁnance term structure factors. Of course, the estimated macro-ﬁnance factors,
Lm
t and Sm
t , may diﬀer from their yields-only counterparts Lt and St; however, as shown below,
diﬀerences between the realized historical time series of these factors are small (although there
are important diﬀerences in the dynamic impulse responses).
In terms of structure, as suggested by the above yields-only factor regressions, the dynamics
of the macro-ﬁnance latent factors are speciﬁed as
Lm
t = ρLLm
t−1 +( 1− ρL)πt + εL,t (4.2)
Sm
t = ρSSm
t−1 +( 1− ρS)[gyyt + gπ(πt − Lm
t )] + uS,t (4.3)
uS,t = ρuuS,t−1 + εS,t, (4.4)
where πt and yt are inﬂation and output (speciﬁcally, capacity utilization).
These equations provide macroeconomic underpinnings for the latent term structure factors.
In equation (4.2), the factor, Lm
t , is interpreted as the underlying rate of inﬂation, that is,
the inﬂation rate targeted by the central bank, as perceived by private agents. Agents are
assumed to slowly modify their views about Lm
t as actual inﬂation changes. As we shall see
from the empirical factor loadings below, Lm
t will be associated with the level of yields with
maturities from 2 to 5 years, which is an important indication of the appropriate horizon to
associate with the inﬂation expectations embodied in Lm
t . In equation (4.3), which mimics the
classic Taylor rule, the slope factor Sm
t captures the central bank’s dual mandate to stabilize
the real economy and keep inﬂation close to its target level. Given the 2- to 5-year horizon of
inﬂation expectations embodied in Lm
t , we believe this factor represents an interim or medium-
term inﬂation target (as in Bomﬁm and Rudebusch 2000). Accordingly, in (4.3), the central
bank is assumed to be attempting to close the gap between actual inﬂation and this interim
inﬂation target. In addition, the dynamics of Sm
t allow for both partial adjustment and serially
correlated shocks. If ρu =0 , the dynamics of Sm
t arise from monetary policy partial adjustment,
13as in equation (3.7). Conversely, if ρS =0 , the dynamics reﬂect the Fed’s reaction to serially
correlated information or events not captured by output and inﬂation, as in equation (3.8).
We close the above equations with a standard small macroeconomic model of inﬂation and
output. Much of the appeal of this so-called New Keynesian speciﬁcation is its theoretical
foundation in a dynamic general equilibrium theory with temporary nominal rigidities; however,
we focus on just the two key aggregate relationships for output and inﬂation.15 One notable
feature of our speciﬁcation is its ﬂexibility in being able to vary the amount of explicitly forward-
looking versus backward-looking behavior in the determination of the macroeconomic variables.
The relative contribution of these two elements is an important unresolved issue in the empirical
macro literature.
A standard theoretical formulation for inﬂation is
πt = µπEtπt+1 +( 1− µπ)πt−1 + αyyt + επ,t , (4.5)
where Etπt+1 is the expectation of period t +1inﬂation conditional on a time t information
set.16 In this speciﬁcation, the current (one-period) inﬂation rate is determined by rational
expectations of future inﬂation, lagged inﬂation, and output. A key parameter is µπ,w h i c h
measures the relative importance of forward- versus backward-looking pricing behavior.17 Since
our model is estimated with monthly data, its empirical speciﬁcation diﬀers from (4.5). Given the
institutional length of price contracts in the real world, the one-period leads and lags in theory
are typically assumed to pertain to periods much longer than one month; indeed, empirical
macroeconomic analyses invariably use data sampled at a quarterly or even annual frequency.
For estimation with monthly data, we reformulate (4.5), with longer leads and lags as,18
πt = µπLm
t +( 1− µπ)[απ1πt−1 + απ2πt−2]+αyyt−1 + επ,t. (4.6)
In this speciﬁcation, inﬂation in the current month is set as a weighted average of the public’s
expectation of the medium-term inﬂation target, which we identify as Lm
t , and two lags of
inﬂation. Also, there is a one-month lag on the output gap to reﬂect the usual adjustment costs
and recognition lags.
15 For explicit derivations and discussion, see Goodfriend and King (1997), Walsh (2003), Svensson (1999),
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), Rudebusch (2002a), and Dennis (2003).
16 As above, data are de-meaned, so no constants are included in the macro equations.
17 As a theoretical matter, the value of µπ is not clearly determined. From well-known models of price-setting
behavior, it is possible to derive an inﬂation equation with µπ ≈ 1. However, many authors assume that with
realistic costs of adjustment and overlapping price and wage contracts there will be some inertia in inﬂation, so
µπ will be less than one (Svensson 1999, Fuhrer and Moore 1995, and Fuhrer 1997).
18 Again, for the empirical analysis, πt is deﬁned as the 12-month percent change in the personal consumption
expenditures price index (Pt) in percent at an annual rate (i.e., πt ≡ 12(pt − pt−1),w h e r ept =1 0 0l nPt).
14The standard New Keynesian theory of aggregate demand can be represented by an intertem-
poral Euler equation of the form:
yt = µyEtyt+1 +( 1− µy)yt−1 − βr(it − Etπt+1)+εy,t . (4.7)
Current output is determined by expected future output, Etyt+1, lagged output, and the ex
ante real interest rate. The parameter µy measures the relative importance of expected future
output versus lagged output, where the latter term is crucial to account for real-world costs
of adjustment and habit formation (e.g., Fuhrer 2000 and Fuhrer and Rudebusch 2003). For
empirical implementation with monthly data, we estimate an equation of the form:
yt = µyEtyt+1 +( 1− µy)[βy1yt−1 + βy2yt−2] − βr(it−1 − Lm
t−1)+εy,t . (4.8)
This equation has an additional lag of output, but the key diﬀerence is the speciﬁcation of the ex
ante real interest rate, which is proxied by it−1−Lm
t−1; that is, agents judge nominal rates against
their view of the underlying future inﬂation not just next month’s inﬂation rate. Also, because
our yields data are end-of-month observations, the t − 1 timing of the real rate is appropriate
for the determination of time t output.
It is useful to note that although the only nominal rate to explicitly enter the aggregate
demand equation is the current short rate, by iterating this equation forward, it can be re-
written in a form where yt depends on the sum of expected future short rates (e.g., Fuhrer and
Rudebusch 2004). Accordingly, there is some link between long nominal rates and aggregate
demand through the path of future short rates. Still, in this aggregate demand speciﬁcation,
shifts in the risk premium component of long rates do not eﬀect output directly, which is also true
in a wide variety of standard theoretical models (see McGough, Rudebusch, and Williams 2004).
It may be interesting to include longer-maturity interest rates (with embedded term premiums)
as a direct determinant of output, but this is computationally diﬃcult because the implied model
must be solved numerically instead of applying the usual linear solution algorithms.
The factor Lm
t , which we interpret as medium-term inﬂation expectations, enters the macro-
ﬁnance model in several contexts. It is the interim inﬂation target in the policy rule, the
expectational anchor for price determination, and the benchmark for the evaluation of nominal
interest rates in output determination. This triple role for Lm
t allows for substantial modeling
simpliﬁcation at the cost of some potential misspeciﬁcation. Typically, policy rules involve
longer-horizon inﬂation targets and inﬂation and output equations use shorter-horizon inﬂation
15expectations. We view our macro-ﬁnance speciﬁcation as an economical compromise that, as
shown below, provides a useful description of term structure and macroeconomic dynamics.
Finally, the speciﬁcation of longer-term yields follows the standard no-arbitrage formulation
described in Section 2 for the yields-only model. The state space of the combined macro-ﬁnance
model can be expressed by equation (2.1) with the re-deﬁnition of the state vector Ft to include
output and inﬂation. The dynamic structure of this transition equation is determined by the
equations (4.2), (4.3), (4.4), (4.6), and (4.8). There are four structural shocks, επ,t, εy,t, εL,t,
and εS,t, which are assumed to be independently and normally distributed. The short rate is
determined by (4.1), while yields of any other maturity are determined under the no-arbitrage
assumption via equation (2.8). (See the appendix for details.) For pricing longer-term bonds,
the risk price associated with the structural shocks is assumed to be a linear function of just Lm
t
and Sm
t and does not directly depend on the other state variables such as current or lagged πt
or yt. Such a risk speciﬁcation, which relies solely on the latent factors Lm
t and Sm
t to determine
interest-rate risk compensations, matches the yields-only formulation in Section 2 and other
empirical ﬁnance research and allows comparison with earlier work.19 However, it should be
stressed that the macroeconomic shocks επ,t and εy,t are still able to aﬀect the price of risk
through their inﬂuence on πt and yt and therefore on the latent factors Lm
t and Sm
t . The eﬀect
of macro shocks on yields will be discussed and illustrated in the next two sections.
4.2. Model Estimates
The above macro-ﬁnance model is estimated by maximum likelihood for the sample period from
January 1988 to December 2000. (See the appendix for details.) The data on bond yields,
inﬂation, and output (capacity utilization) are the same as deﬁned above.
Before examining the parameter estimates of the model, it is useful to compare the time
series of Lm
t and Sm
t extracted from the estimated macro-ﬁnance model with the Lt and St
extracted from the yields-only model. This is done in Figures 4 and 5. In both ﬁgures, the
macro-ﬁnance model estimates of these factors (the solid lines) closely match the yields-only
estimates (the dashed lines). Indeed, the two level factors have a correlation of .97, and the two
slope factors have a correlation of .98. This close correspondence suggests that our macro-ﬁnance
factors Lm
t and Sm
t can indeed be, at least loosely, termed “level” and “slope” factors. Even
19 Therefore, λ1 continues to have just four non-zero entries, which greatly reduces the number of parameters
to be estimated.
16more importantly, our macro-ﬁnance interpretation of these factors will have a direct bearing
on the existing ﬁnance literature since we have obtained a very similar time series of factors.
However, even though the historical evolution of Lm
t and Sm
t over the sample closely matches
that of Lt and St, the two sets of factors have notable diﬀerences in model dynamics and impulse
responses, as discussed below.
Table 3 reports the parameter estimates of the macro-ﬁnance model. First, consider the
dynamics of the factors. The factor Lm
t is very persistent, with a ρL estimate of .989, which
implies a small but signiﬁcant weight on actual inﬂation. In contrast, the dynamics of Sm
t in the
macro-ﬁnance model can be given a very diﬀerent interpretation than in the yields-only model.
Obviously, as evident in Figure 5, the estimates of Sm
t are persistent in both models; however,
in the macro-ﬁnance model, this persistence does not come from partial adjustment since the ρS
estimate is a minuscule .026. Instead, Sm
t responds with only a very short lag to output and
inﬂation. The persistence in Sm
t reﬂects the fact that the Fed adjusts the short rate promptly
to various determinants–output, inﬂation, and other inﬂuences in the residual ut–that are
themselves quite persistent (e.g., ρu = .975). Thus, our estimate of ρS decisively dismisses the
interest rate smoothing or monetary policy inertia interpretation of the persistence in the short
rate. The persistent deviations of slope from ﬁtted slope shown in Figure 3 occur not because
the Fed was slow to react to output and inﬂation but because the Fed responds to a variety of
persistent determinants beyond current output and inﬂation. Some intuition for this result is
given in the next subsection.
The monetary policy interpretation of the slope factor is supported by the values of the esti-
mated inﬂation and output response coeﬃcients, gπ and gy, which are 1.25 and 0.20, respectively.
These estimates are similar to the usual single-equation estimates of the Taylor rule during this
sample period (e.g., Rudebusch 2002b). Overall, the macro-ﬁnance model estimates conﬁrm the
interpretation suggested by the regressions in Section 3, although the system estimation of a
complete model provides tighter standard errors.
The estimated parameters describing the inﬂation dynamics also appear reasonable.20 In
particular, the estimated weight on explicit forward-looking expectations in determining inﬂa-
tion, µπ, is 0.074. Since this estimate is based on monthly data, with time aggregation, it implies
20 After taking into account time aggregation and the higher cyclical variability of capacity utilization compared
with the output gap, the elasticity of inﬂation with respect to output (αy = .014) appears about half the size of
estimates that use the entire postwar sample of quarterly data, for example, Rudebusch (2002a). The estimate
does appear more in line with estimates obtained in recent shorter samples (Rudebusch 2001).
17a weight of about 0.21 on the interim inﬂation objective at a quarterly frequency. This estimate
appears consistent with many earlier estimates obtained using a variety of diﬀerent methods
and speciﬁcations. For example, using survey data on expectations, Rudebusch (2002a) obtains
a broadly comparable µπ estimate of 0.29, which is in the middle of the range of estimates in
the literature. However, by using the yield curve to extract inﬂation expectations, our estimates
bring new information to bear on this important macroeconomic question.
The estimated parameters describing the output dynamics also fall within reasonable ranges.21
Speciﬁcally, the estimated value of µy = .009, implies a negligible weight at a quarterly frequency
on forward-looking output expectations in the determination of output behavior. This is very
much in accord with the maximum likelihood estimation results reported by Fuhrer and Rude-
busch (2003).
The risk price matrix (λ1) appears signiﬁcant, and the model ﬁts the 3-month, 12-month,
and 36-month yields with measurement error standard deviations that are quite comparable to
the yields-only model.
4.3. Analysis of Dynamics
The dynamics of the estimated macro-ﬁnance model are quite interesting and intuitive.22 First,
consider the instantaneous responses of the yield curve to a positive shock in Lm
t or Sm
t .T h e s e
responses are displayed in Figure 6.23 As is clear from the structure of the factor dynamics
above, a shock to Lm
t has two very diﬀerent eﬀects on the short rate it. First, it directly raises
the short rate one-for-one according to equation (4.1). Second, from (4.3), an increase in Lm
t
reduces Sm
t and pushes down the short rate by more than one-for-one–given the estimate of
gπ =1 .20. The macroeconomic interpretation of this latter eﬀect is that an increase in the
p e r c e i v e di n ﬂ a t i o nt a r g e tm u s tb ea s s o c i a t e dw i t ha neasing of monetary conditions so inﬂation
can rise to its new target.24 Given some persistence in inﬂation, easier monetary conditions
(lower real rates) require an initial decline in the short-term nominal interest rate. This second
21 The interest rate sensitivity of output (βr = .089), after taking into account the time aggregation and the
use of capacity utilization rather than the output gap, appears broadly in line with estimates that use the entire
postwar sample of quarterly data.
22 We also performed a variety of model assessments based on various moments of simulated yields from the
yields-only and macro-ﬁnance models. The simulation results conﬁrmed that these two models generated very
similar term structure dynamic moments that also matched the data. In partciular, the variances and covariances
of the short and the long end of the yield curve and the autoregressive coeﬃcients are all very close.
23 These instantaneous responses are analogous to those in Figure 1 for the yields-only model; but here the St
“factor loadings” take into account the loadings on output and inﬂation.
24 In a model without nominal rigidities or persistence, inﬂation would simply jump to the new target. Such a
model, with µπ =1 , does not appear to ﬁt the data.
18eﬀect dominates at the short end, so a positive shock to Lm
t initially lowers short-term yields.
However, at intermediate- and long-term maturities, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates, and the increase
in Lm
t raises the yields one-for-one, as in the yields-only model. Therefore, the initial eﬀect of
an increase in Lm
t is not quite a parallel shift of the yield curve, but rather a tilt upward. The
initial response of the yield curve to a positive shock in Sm
t is similar to the one shown in Figure
1 for the yields-only model. A positive shock to Sm
t (speciﬁcally to εS,t) increases short-term
bond yields but has progressively less eﬀect on bonds of greater maturity. Thus, the positive
shock initially decreases the slope of the yield curve and produces a tilt downward.25
At ﬁrst glance, Figure 6 may appear somewhat inconsistent with Figures 1 and 4. Speciﬁ-
cally, although Lm
t and Lt appear to move together over the historical sample (Figure 4), their
impulses induce diﬀerent initial responses in the yield curve (as a comparison of Figures 1 and 6
illustrates). However, a reconciliation of these results is suggested by examining a “rotation” or
re-deﬁnition of the state space of the yields-only model that is observationally equivalent to the
original yields-only model. As shown in the appendix, there is a rotated yields-only model that
can closely match both the factor loadings of the macro-ﬁnance model as well as the historical
behavior of the level and slope factors in the original yields-only model and in the macro-ﬁnance
model. That is, the estimated paths of level and slope are largely insensitive to the exact form
of the factor loadings.
In addition, as is clear from equation (4.2), the macro-ﬁnance model is parsing out some
of the traditional level shock eﬀect to inﬂation. Indeed, similar to Figure 6, the solid lines
in Figure 7 display the initial responses of the yield curve to inﬂation and output shocks in
the estimated macro-ﬁnance model. Positive shocks to inﬂation and output in this model are
followed by immediate increases in short-term interest rates, and for the inﬂation shock, these
increases are more than one-for-one. These quick responses reﬂect the absence of monetary
policy partial adjustment or inertia (the estimated ρS = .026). In contrast, the dashed lines in
Figure 7 display the yield curve responses from a model that is identical to the estimated macro-
ﬁnance model except that ρS is set equal to .9 and ρu equals 0. This hypothetical alternative
model has substantial monetary policy inertia, and it displays markedly weaker responses to
inﬂation and output shocks of yields that have maturities less than two years. The two quite
diﬀerent responses of the yield curve in these models illustrate the potential importance of the




t might be better labled “Long-term” and “Short-term” factors because
those are the locations of maximum inﬂuence; however, we will continue using the standard terminology.
19information from the term structure for discriminating between the two models. Given the
system ML estimates, it is clear that the data prefer the macro-ﬁnance model without policy
inertia.
Now consider the dynamics of the macro-ﬁnance model more generally. Figures 8 and 9
display the impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables and bond yields to a one standard
deviation increase in each of the four structural shocks in the model. Each response is measured
as a percentage point deviation from the steady state. Figure 8 focuses on the macro shocks,
and the ﬁrst column shows the impulse responses to an inﬂation shock. Such a shock leads to
an instant 25-basis point increase in the inﬂation rate, which is gradually reversed over the next
two years. Inﬂation does not, however, return to its original level because the sustained period
of higher inﬂation boosts perceptions of the underlying inﬂation target Lm
t . The initial jump in
inﬂation also induces a tightening of monetary policy that raises the slope factor and short-term
interest rates. Indeed, the 1-month rate ﬁrst jumps about 30 basis points and then gradually
falls. The 12-month and 5-year yields also increase in response to the inﬂation shock but by
smaller amounts. The higher interest rates lead to a gradual decrease in output, which damps
inﬂation.
The second column of Figure 8 displays the impulse responses to a positive output shock,
which increases capacity utilization by .6 percentage point. The higher output gradually boosts
inﬂation, and in response to higher output and inﬂation, the central bank increases the slope
factor and interest rates. In contrast to the diﬀerential interest rate responses in the ﬁrst column,
all of the interest rates in the second column show fairly similar increases. The bond yields of
all maturities are still approximately 5 basis points higher than their initial levels even 5 years
after the shock, because the rise in inﬂation has passed through to the perceived inﬂation target
Lm
t .
One particularly noteworthy feature of the responses in Figure 8 is how long-term interest
rates respond to macroeconomic shocks. As stressed by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003),
long rates do appear empirically to respond to news about macroeconomic variables; however,
standard macroeconomic models generally cannot reproduce such movements because their vari-
ables revert to the steady state too quickly. By allowing for time variation in the inﬂation target,
the macro-ﬁnance model can generate long-lasting macro eﬀects and hence long rates that do
respond to the macro shocks.
20Figure 9 provides the responses of the variables to perceived changes in monetary policy.
There are two types of such policy changes to consider (as in Haldane and Read 2000 and
Ellingsen and Söderström 2001): namely, changes in policy preferences and changes in macro-
economic policy determinants. In the macro-ﬁnance model, the ﬁrst is a perceived shift in the
inﬂation target or level factor.26 The ﬁrst column displays the impulse responses to such a level
shock, which increases the inﬂation target by 34 basis points–essentially on a permanent basis.
In order to push inﬂation up to this higher target, the monetary authority must ease rates, so
the slope factor and the 1-month rate fall immediately after the level shock. The short rate
then gradually rises to a long-run average that essentially matches the increase in the inﬂation
target. The 12-month rate reaches the new long-run level more quickly, and the 5-year yield
jumps up to that level immediately. The easing of monetary policy in real terms boosts output
and inﬂation. Inﬂation converges to the new inﬂation target, but output returns to about its
initial level.
The second column of Figure 9 displays the response to a slope shock, which is the second
type of policy change: a perceived policy response to some development in the economy–other
than current output and inﬂation–such as a credit crunch reﬂecting balance sheet problems in
the banking system, an asset price misalignment relative to fundamentals, or a development in
foreign economies abroad.27 A one standard deviation slope shock raises the 1-month interest
rate by 56 basis points, and raises the 12-month and 5-year yields by 42 and 5 basis points,
respectively. Furthermore, in response to this persistent slope shock, interest rates remain
elevated for a considerable period of time. Given this sustained tighter monetary policy, the
capacity utilization rate gradually declines and remains well below its initial level for several
years, generating a decline in inﬂation as well. Falling inﬂation translates into perceptions of a
declining inﬂation target, which eventually helps push all interest rates to fall below their initial
values. The eﬀects on output and inﬂation are very persistent because of the long-lasting nature
of the slope shock.
Finally, a useful supplementary description of model dynamics can be obtained from the
26 Such a shift could reﬂect the imperfect transparency of an unchanged actual inﬂation goal in the U.S. or its
imperfect credibility.
27 For example, see the discussion by Chairman Greenspan in footnote 12 or this explanation by Federal Reserve
Governor Laurence Meyer (1999, p. 7) of the easing of policy during late 1998: “There are three developments,
each of which, I believe, contributed to this decline in the funds rate relative to Taylor Rule prescription. The
ﬁrst event was the dramatic ﬁnancial market turbulence, following the Russian default and devaluation. The
decline in the federal funds rate was, in my view, appropriate to oﬀset the sharp deterioration in ﬁnancial market
conditions, including wider private risk spreads, evidence of tighter underwriting and loan terms at banks, and
sharply reduced liquidity in ﬁnancial markets.”
21variance decomposition shown in Table 4 (with the caveat that the decompositions at the 60-
month horizon are based on only two independent observations in our short sample). At horizons
of about 12 months and shorter, inﬂation is driven largely by its own idiosyncratic shocks,
while at horizons of several years, shocks to the inﬂation target determine inﬂation. Similarly,
aggregate output is driven primarily by its own shocks over short horizons, but over long horizons,
output is heavily inﬂuenced by shocks to slope (almost 70 percent of the variance is attributed to
slope at a 5-year horizon). This inﬂuence reﬂects the fact that the slope shock is very persistent;
that is, monetary policy was pushed away from a simple Taylor rule recommendation in response
to some development in the economy, such as a credit crunch, that lasted for a considerable
period of time, and this deviation has left a long-lasting imprint on the real economy as well.
Turning to the interest rate decompositions, the 1-month yield is driven by all four shocks,
but predominantly by slope. The 12-month yield is driven by slope and level shocks and, to a
lesser extent, by output and inﬂation shocks. Movements in the 5-year yield can be attributed
to shocks to level. It is useful to compare these results to some of the VAR studies in this
ﬁeld. For conciseness, we focus on the 12-month yield at a 12-month horizon. In our results,
10 percent of this variation is attributed to output shocks and almost 40 percent to inﬂation
and the inﬂation target (that is, inﬂation plus the level factor). In Diebold, Rudebusch, and
Auroba (2004, Table 4), the comparable ﬁgures are 7 percent and 24 percent, respectively. In
Ang and Piasezzi (2003, Table 9), the results are 19 percent and 53 percent (treating their ﬁrst
unobserved factor as a level factor). In Evans and Marshall (2004, Table 1), the ﬁgures are 24
percent and 40 percent (adding together overall and commodity price inﬂation). Overall, there
is a remarkable similarity, especially given the diﬀerences in data sample, variable deﬁnition,
and methodology among these studies.
5. Conclusion
By constructing and estimating a combined macro-ﬁnance framework, this paper describes the
economic underpinnings of the yield curve. In particular, it characterizes the relationships
between the no-arbitrage latent term structure factors and various macroeconomic variables.
The level factor is given an interpretation as the perceived medium-term central bank inﬂation
target. The slope factor is related to cyclical variation in inﬂation and output gaps. In particular,
the slope factor varies as the central bank moves the short end of the yield curve up and down
22in order to achieve its macroeconomic policy goals.
The estimated macro-ﬁnance model also provides several interesting empirical results. No-
tably, using a new methodology, the results conﬁrm the conclusions of Rudebusch (2002b) that
the amount of partial adjustment in the setting of monetary policy is negligible. Also, new
information is drawn from the yield curve on the issue of the importance of expectations in
the determination of output and inﬂation. These results conﬁrm a statistically signiﬁcant but
limited role for expectations.
Still, there are several promising avenues for future research to improve the macro-ﬁnance
linkages in this model. For example, the speciﬁcation linking the level factor to inﬂation in our
model is rudimentary and mechanical, since ﬁnancial market participants in fact are undoubtedly
conducting a subtle ﬁltering of the available data to obtain underlying inﬂation objectives.
Similarly, the link between the slope factor and output and inﬂation leaves much–notably, the
large persistent residual us,t–to be explained rigorously. Presumably, an elaboration of the
policy response to include real-time data and a forward-looking perspective would help.
Finally, we should stress that the macro-ﬁnance term structure literature is in its infancy, and
like others in this literature, our model is an intermediate step between an atheoretical empirical
representation and a deep theoretical one. We think such intermediate models are useful and
interesting, but we also understand the desire to obtain a complete speciﬁcation in terms of
underlying preference and technology parameters. However, the aﬃne term structure models
in the ﬁnance literature are largely statistical in nature, and the nominal discount factor is not
expressed in terms of marginal utility and inﬂation. In particular, the ﬁnance literature has not
yet justiﬁed–in terms of underlying preferences–the popular aﬃne risk-price representation
that we adopt. This state-dependent speciﬁcation of the market price of risk may seem ad hoc,
but it is widely used in term structure studies because it performs well in matching certain
empirical properties (e.g., Dai and Singleton 2002). One of the goals of our study is to provide
a macroeconomic interpretation of the term structure factors found in this existing ﬁnance
literature; thus, we adopt the usual aﬃne risk-price speciﬁcation of that literature. Ideally,
of course, the representation of the price of risk would be consistent with the preferences and
technology underpinning the output and inﬂation equations. However, just as the link between
the utility function and the price of risk is implicit in the aﬃne speciﬁcation, the link between the
utility function and the model of inﬂation and output (which includes goods for consumption,
23investment, as well as export) is also implicit in our speciﬁcation. That is, we have joined
together an aﬃne term structure model with a hybrid New Keynesian model, each of which
have empirical successes in their respective areas but also have somewhat tacit, even tenuous,
theoretical foundations. The goal of linking risk pricing, interest rates, output, and inﬂation
together in a deep theoretical speciﬁcation of preferences and technology (so the asset pricing
kernel is consistent with the macrodynamics) and still retaining an empirical ﬁt remains a major
challenge for the future.
24A. Appendix on Bond Pricing and Macro-Finance Model Estimation
No-Arbitrage Bond Pricing
The bond-pricing equations relevant for both models are discrete-time analogs of the continuous-
time version in section 3 of Duﬃe and Kan (1996).
The state space of both models can be expressed as
Ft = ρFt−1 +Σ εt. (A.1)
In the yields-only model, the state vector Ft includes Lt and St, while in the macro-ﬁnance
model, Ft includes output and inﬂation as described below. The above equation describes the
evolution of the n × 1 state vector Ft under the physical measure.
Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Harrison and Pliska (1981) state that, under certain regularity
conditions, no-arbitrage conditions imply the existence of an equivalent martingale measure.
Suppose under this measure, the evolution of Ft follows
Ft = κQ +ρQFt−1 +Σ ε
Q
t , (A.2)
where κQ is an n × 1 vector and ρQ is an n × n transition matrix. The superscript Q denotes
the parameters under the equivalent martingale measure.
Note that from the deﬁnition of the one-period interest rate (2.2), the logarithm of the price
of a one-period bond can be expressed as
ln(b1,t)=−δ0 − δ 
1Ft
= A1 + B
 
1Ft. (A.3)




The no-arbitrage conditions imply that, under the equivalent martingale measure, the expected
gross return for holding a j-period bond for one period should be identical to the gross return
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1Ft}. (A.5)
Matching the coeﬃcients of the terms in brackets yields














j =0 . (A.6)
Next we provide links between the evolution of the state under the physical measure and
the equivalent martingale measure, i.e., equations (A.1) and (A.2). Providing this connection is
equivalent to specifying the dynamics of the price of risk. Given the risk price representation
Λt = λ0 + λ1Ft,t h el a wo fm o t i o no ft h es t a t ev e c t o rFt can be expressed as
Ft = κQ + ρQFt−1 +Σ Λ t +Σ εt
=( κQ +Σ λ0)+( ρQ +Σ λ1)Ft−1 +Σ εt
= ρFt−1 +Σ εt. (A.7)
Therefore we have κQ+Σλ0 =0and ρ = ρQ+Σλ1. Substituting these into equation (A.6) gives














1; j =2 ,... (A.8)
which match equations (2.6) and (2.7).
State-Space Representation of Macro-Finance Model
Substitute equation (4.1) into (4.8) and eliminate it:
yt = µyEtyt+1 +(1− µy)[βy1yt−1 + βy2yt−2] − βrSm
t−1 + εy,t
Deﬁne Yt =[πt πt−1 yt yt−1 Lm
t Sm
t us,t Etyt+1 ] ,
26Γ0 =

         





ρl − 1 00010 0 0









         

(1 − µπ)απ1 (1 − µπ)απ2 αy1 00 0 0 0
1000 0 0 0 0
00 ( 1 − µy)βy1 (1 − µy)βy2 0 −βr 00
0010 0 0 0 0
0000 ρl 00 0
0000 0 ρs 00
0000 0 0 ρu 0
0000 0 0 0 1

















         

, εt =[επ,t εy,t εl,t εs,t ] , Π = [ 00000001 ]  ,
and ηt =( yt −Et−1yt), which is the expectational error in forecasting yt in period t −1. Then,
the system can be written as
Γ0Yt =Γ 1Yt−1 +Ψ εt +Π ηt. (A.9)
We use Christopher Sims’s algorithm (Sims 2001) to solve the system, and the solution is in
the form of
Yt =Γ Yt−1 +Ω εt. (A.10)
Moreover, the expectation of yt in period t−1, Et−1yt, can be expressed by other variables in Yt.
Therefore, the state vector of the system becomes Ft =[πt πt−1 yt yt−1 Lm
t Sm
t us,t ] ,
a n dt h el a wo fm o t i o no ft h es t a t e
Ft = ρFt−1 +Σ εt
can be obtained from the solution (A.10) where ρ is the 7 × 7 u p p e rl e f tc o r n e ro fΓ,a n dΣ is
the 7 × 4 upper part of Ω.
27Log-Likelihood Function of Macro-Finance Model
We use data on πt, yt, and 1-, 3-, 12-, 36-, and 60-month bond yields. Since the underlying
term structure model has two latent factors, three of the bond yields must be postulated to ﬁt
with measurement error. We assume that the 3-, 12-, and 36-month bond yields are measured
with i.i.d. error. Therefore, given a speciﬁc vector of parameter values θ, both the latent factors
Lm
t and Sm
t and the bond yield measurement errors can be obtained from the inversion of the
bond pricing formula (2.8).
Deﬁne Rt =[it i60,t i3,t i12,t i36,t ]  and B =[B1 B60 B3 B12 B36 ] .C o n d i -
tional on the ﬁrst t − 1 observations, the tth observation zt =( πt,y t,R t)  is Gaussian:
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The vectors ρ1,., ρ3,., Σ1,. and Σ3,. are the ﬁrst and third rows of the matrices ρ and Σ,r e s p e c -
tively, and εm
t is a 3 × 1 vector containing the measurement errors.
The logarithm of the conditional density of the tth observation can then be expressed as










(zt − ΓzFt−1) (ΩzΩz )−1(zt − ΓzFt−1)(A.12)





The log-likelihood is then maximized to obtain the ML estimates of the parameters, denoted
  θMLE. Finally, the standard errors of   θMLE are numerically computed based on the estimates
of inverse of Hessian matrix at the convergence point.
Rotated Yields-Only Model
As noted in Subsection 4.3, it is possible to rotate the state space of the yields-only model
so that its factor loadings look very similar to those from macro-ﬁnance model. Such a rotation
28does not aﬀect any of the observational characteristics of the model for bond prices and is
possible because the factors are unobservables.
In particular, we perform an “invariant aﬃne transformation” as deﬁned in Dai and Singleton
(2000):
FN
t = ZFt + ϑ,
where Z is a 2 × 2 matrix and ϑ is a 2 × 1 vector. Accordingly, deﬁne δN
0 = δ0 − δ Z−1
1 ϑ,
δ 
1 = Z −1
δ1, ρN = ZρZ−1, ΣN = ZΣ, λN
0 = λ0 −λ−1
1 Zϑ,a n dλN
1 = λ−1
1 Z.28 Bond yields in the
rotated yields-only model are determined by the aﬃne structure ij,t = AN
j + BN 
j FN
t . For any
full-rank matrix Z, the rotation will not aﬀect any of the bond yields.
We choose a particular value of Z so that the short and long ends of the loadings of the rotated
factors FN
t are the same as those of the macro factors Fm
t .29 The rotated level factor LN is a
linear combination of the original yields-only level factor L and slope factor S;h o w e v e r ,a ss h o w n
in the Appendix Figure, the loadings of this rotated level factor LN are no longer horizontal as
in Figure 1 but are upwardly tilted as for macro factor Lm in Figure 6. Furthermore, as shown
in the Appendix Figure, a time plot of the estimated rotated level factor LN is very similar to
those of the original level factor L and of the macro factor Lm. That is, the estimated paths of
level and slope are relatively insensitive to the factor loadings.
28 The vector ϑ is set to zero as it only aﬀects the constant terms of the bond yields, and in the model estimation
all bond yield data are de-meaned.
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33Table 1
Yields-Only Model Parameter Estimates
Factor dynamics (ρ)
Lt−1 St−1
Lt 0.997 (0.0014) –
St 0.021 (0.0013) 0.945 (0.0039)
Risk price (λ1)
Lt St
ΛL,t -0.0148 (0.0013) 0.0032 (0.0014)








Note: Standard errors of the estimates are in parentheses.
Table 2
Yields-Only Model Variance Decomposition
Forecast Horizon Level Slope
1-month yield
1 month 28.7 71.3
12 months 44.3 55.7
60 months 76.8 23.2
12-month yield
1 month 35.4 41.4
12 months 58.2 36.4
60 months 84.6 13.8
5-year yield
1 month 88.6 11.4
12 months 93.1 6.9
60 months 97.8 2.2
34Table 3
Macro-Finance Model Parameter Estimates
Factor dynamics
ρL 0.989 (0.0068) gπ 1.253 (0.0066)
ρS 0.026 (0.0111) gy 0.200 (0.0066)
ρu 0.975 (0.0062)
Inﬂation dynamics
µπ 0.074 (0.0113) απ1 1.154 (0.0525)
αy 0.014 (0.0074) απ2 -0.155 (0.0066)
Output dynamics
µy 0.009 (0.0066) βy1 0.918 (0.0604)





ΛL,t -0.0045 (0.0068) 0.0168 (0.0068)
ΛS,t -0.0223 (0.0064) 0.0083 (0.0067)
Standard deviations
σL 0.342 (0.0089) σπ 0.238 (0.0110)
σS 0.559 (0.0313) σy 0.603 (0.0128)




Note: Standard errors of the estimates are in parentheses.
35Table 4
Macro-Finance Model Variance Decomposition
Forecast Horizon Inﬂation Output Level Slope
Inﬂation
1 month 97.3 0.1 2.7 0.0
12 months 52.1 2.8 44.7 0.4
60 months 6.8 2.6 82.1 8.6
Output
1 month 0.1 99.3 0.2 0.4
12 months 4.5 67.8 6.0 21.8
60 months 4.2 20.9 5.6 69.3
1-month yield
1 month 22.0 3.4 0.3 74.3
12 months 14.7 7.3 9.6 68.4
60 months 5.1 7.1 58.6 29.1
12-month yield
1 month 10.7 6.3 8.6 56.3
12 months 5.6 10.0 34.1 46.1
60 months 1.6 6.3 74.7 16.3
5-year yield
1 month 0.5 5.0 93.1 1.4
12 months 0.2 4.1 95.3 0.5
60 months 0.1 2.0 92.9 5.0




















Figure 1: Factor Loadings of Yields-Only Model
Note: These factor loadings show the impact response from a 1 percentage




















Figure 2: Yields-Only Level Factor and Inflation Indicators
Note: The estimated level factor from the yields-only model is shown, along 
with de-meaned annual inflation and one-year-ahead expected inflation from the 
Michigan Survey.  From 1997 through 2000, 10-year-ahead expected inflation 
(not demeaned), which is the spread between 10-year nominal and indexed Treasury 
debt, is also shown.
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Figure 3: Yields-Only Slope Factor and Fitted Taylor Rule
Note: The estimated slope factor from the yields-only model is shown, along with 























































Note: These curves show the impact response from a 1 percentage point increase 
in level or slope on the yield of a given maturity.
Figure 6: Initial Yield Curve Response to Level and Slope Shocks in Macro-Finance Model0 20 40 60 80 100 120
















Responses in macro-finance model
Responses in model with policy inertia





Note: The solid lines show the impact responses on the yield curve from a 1 
percentage point increase in inflation or output in the estimated macro-finance  
model.  The dashed lines give similar responses in a macro-finance model that  
assumes substantial monetary policy inertia (ρS = 0.9) and serially uncorrelated  





Impulse Responses to Inflation Shock






Impulse Responses to Output Shock


































Figure 8: Impulse Responses to Macro Shocks in Macro-Finance Model 






Impulse Responses to Level Shock







Impulse Responses to Slope Shock



































Figure 9: Impulse Responses to Policy Shocks in Macro-Finance Model 




















































































Appendix Figure: Rotated Yields-Only Model